Reliability and Responsibility: a Theory of Endogenous Commitment by Triossi, Matteo
Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=808924
Reliability and Responsibility: A Theory of
Endogenous Commitment
Matteo Triossiy
Collegio Carlo Alberto
April 2007
Abstract
A common assumption in Political Science literature is policy commit-
ment: candidates maintain their electoral promises. We study its validity
and we prove that is an costless electoral is an e¤ective way of transmit-
ting information to voters. We investigate the responsiveness of policies
to electoral promises depending on politiciansmotivations. The results
are robust to relevant equilibrium renements.
JEL Classication: D72, P16, C73
Keywords: Information Transmission, Electoral Campaign, Endogenous
Commitment.
The paper is a revised version of the rst chapter of my dissertation at Universidad Carlos
III. I would like to thank my advisors Luis Corchón amd Antonio Romero-Medina. It has
beneted from comments by Enriqueta Aragonès, Gregory Dow, Giovanna Iannantuoni, Paco
Marhuenda, Corrado di Maria, Dennis Mueller , Socorro Puy, Francesco de Sinopoli, Tim
Worrall and seminar participants at University Carlos III, University of Durham, at the XXX
Simposio de Análisis Económico, at the First PhD Presentation Meeting, at the RES Annual
Conference 2006 and at the Eight International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and
Welfare.
yMailing address: Collegio Carlo Alberto, Via Real Collegio 30, 10024 Moncalieri (TO).
E-mail: matteo.triossi.@collegiocarloalberto.it, webpage: http://www.carloalberto.org/people/triossi
1
Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=808924
1 Introduction
It is commonplace to say that electoral promises cannot be taken at their face
value. However, parties and candidates invest a considerable amount of ef-
fort and resources in producing electoral messages. While earlier studies of
the Columbia School (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948 and Berelson,
Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954) assigned only marginal e¤ect to electoral cam-
paigns, there is now a large consensus among scholars that they do matter (see
Alvarez 1998 and Brady, Johnston and Sides 2006).
But if campaigns were a mere act of promising why should they inuence
citizens? A widely employed explanation is that politicians and elected o¢ -
cials seek reelection. Electoral promises a¤ect voters expectations about the
policies that the elected o¢ cials will choose. They provide a benchmark link-
ing promises, policies and reelection, because a credible threat to reelection is
imposed (see Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986 and Austen-Smith and Banks 1989).
The disciplining role of electoral competition is only one face of the coin.
Electoral promises provide also a solution to the informational asymmetries
between candidates and politicians. Campaigns convey information useful to
predict future policies and future policies should be predictable from present
ones. The intuition dates back at least to Downs (1957), who underlies the
relationship between preelection statements and post election behavior.
Now we try to prove that a partys ideology must be consis-
tent with either (1) its actions in prior election periods, or (2) its
statements in the preceding campaign (including its ideology), or (3)
both... A party is reliable if its policy statements at the beginning
of an election period-including those in its preëlection campaign-can
be used to make accurate predictions of its behavior... A party is
responsible if its policies in one period are consistent with its ac-
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tions (or statements in the preceding period)... We conclude that
reliability is a logical necessity in any rational election system, and
that responsibility-though not logically necessary-is strongly implied
by rationality as we dene it ...(pp. 103-107).
However, most of the formal models of electoral competitions assume that
politicians commit to their electoral announcements. The questions about the
credibility of campaign promises are left unanswered.
The objective of this paper is to provide an explanation based on the in-
teraction of informational asymmetries and reelection concerns. We provide a
model where they concur in shaping implemented policies
Each one of the arguments alone is not able to provide a satisfactory so-
lution to the puzzle. Under complete information, politicians cannot credibly
commit to policies di¤erent from their favorite ones unless elections are in-
nitely repeated (Alesina 1988). In this case, the use of trigger strategies and
retrospective voting raise doubts about the credibility of the electoral threats.1
If information is incomplete and elections are not repeated electoral campaign
cannot be informative (Harrington 1992a) unless one drops the assumption of
full policy enforceability (Harrington 1992b).
We introduce a model where politiciansand voterspolicy preferences are
private informations. The type space is continuous and beliefs are derived from
a common prior. Politicians care both about the policy and holding the of-
ce. Elections are held twice. Prior to the rst election the candidates make
a costless policy announcement. The elected candidate implements a policy,
not necessarily the announced one and runs for reelection against a randomly
chosen opponent. The elected politician will nally implement a policy that will
coincide with her favorite one, because there are not further elections.
1Aragonés and al. (2006) attempt to characterize to which policies candidates can credibly
commit with an innite horizon.
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The analysis focuses on symmetric and monotonic equilibria in which cen-
trist politicians are elected with higher probabilities and implement more cen-
trist policies. Monotonic equilibria exclude unlikely behaviors where extremists
present themselves as centrist, while moderates implement extremist policies.2
Out-of-equilibrium beliefs with regard to completely unexpected policies, are
rened adapting D1 Criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987), to monotonic environ-
mentsusing a renement rst introduced by Bernheim and Severinov (2003).3
The set of the equilibria that survive are completely characterized.
The game does not have fully separating equilibrium. Reelection pressures
and policy motivations interact making electoral promises relevant, when candi-
datespolicy preferences are intense enough. At the campaign stage the candi-
dates endogenously di¤erentiate in two pools: centrist candidates and extrem-
ists. The degree in which incumbents are made accountable of their announce-
ments di¤erent and vary with their ideal policies. Electoral pressure is more
e¤ective on centrist candidates who, in the rst term, stick to the announced
platform, the one that guarantees the highest chances of reelection. They ac-
tuate as pure o¢ ce seekers, but they have to implement policy that is faraway
from their favorite one. Extremist politicians su¤er a stronger tension between
pleasing their constituencies and seeking the reelection so they separate in pol-
icy. Still, they are forced to support more moderate policies than their favorite
ones and see their reelection chances reduced.4 This prevent policy convergence.
The result accounts for partial but relevant responsiveness of politicians to their
electoral statements, consistently with empirical studies (see Harrington 1992b).
We present an example of electoral equilibrium where extremists completely
separate in campaign and in policy. This equilibrium eventually converges to a
2We prove that in every non-monotonic equilibrium electoral campaign must provide some
valuable information.
3See also Kartik (2005).
4This centripetal tendency is consistent with the results obtained in di¤erent setups by
Calvert (1985), Alesina and Spear (1988) and Harrington (1992c).
4
completely separating one, when candidates degree of policy concern approaches
innity. It is not robust to the equilibrium renement introduced but is never-
theless interesting, because it suggests the possibility of an even more informa-
tive role for electoral campaign.
The paper that is closest to our approach is Harrington (1993). He presents
a model of nitely (twice) repeated elections under bilateral asymmetric infor-
mation, with a nite type space (two politicianstypes and two electorstypes).
Beliefs are not consistent with the common prior assumption. Candidates care
about their income, politicians are lexicographic, rst they care about reelec-
tion then about their favorite policy. An exogenous form of uncertainty about
the e¤ect of the policy is present. The author proves there exist equilibria in
which each candidate truthfully announces and implements her favorite policy.
This result is driven by the e¤ect of reelection concerns and by the residual
uncertainty on the policy outcome, that prevents the equilibrium to unravel.
Policy preferences play only a tie-breaking role. The model present also equi-
libria in which politicians implement their least favorite policy, because there is
no interaction between reelection concerns and policy preferences.
Related to our paper are also the works by Banks (1990) and Callander
and Wilkie (2007). They study a model of a one-shot electoral competition
with incomplete information where there is no commitment to policy so that
every candidate will implement his ideal position if elected. However, candi-
dates su¤er an exogenous cost of lying that increases with the magnitude of
their lies and makes possible an informative electoral campaign. In our model
endogenous lying costs appear for the concurring e¤ects of electoral concerns
and policy preferences. An interesting contribution of Callander and Wilkie
(2007) is introducing a portion of politicians who do not su¤er any costs of
lying.5
5Kartik and McAfee (2007) present a complementary approach where some candidates
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The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the model of
electoral competition. In Section 4 I present some preliminary results that clarify
our choices and I prove the impossibility of fully honest behavior. Section 5
introduces the equilibrium renement. The main results are presented in Section
6. Section 7 discusses the results. Finally, Section 8 draws the conclusion and
suggests possible directions of future research. The Proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Model
The models builds on a standard Downs one dimensional location game. Elec-
tions are repeated twice.
The policy space is denoted by X = [ D;D], where D > 0. There is a
continuum of voters having quadratic preferences over the policy space, and
who care about the policy implementing in the following term. Each voter
is identied by her ideal point so a voter of type  2 [ D;D] derives utility
V (x; ) =  ( x)2 from the implementation of policy x. Median voters ideal
point is drawn from a symmetric distribution G on [ D;D], with continuous
density, g() = G0().6
There are two candidates: R(ight) and L(eft). Departing from Downs, we as-
sume that they care both about being elected and the policy they will implement
once in o¢ ce. Like voters they are be identied by their favorite policy. A posi-
tive real number y > 0 represents the benet a candidate gets from holding the
o¢ ce, and a factor k > 0 measures the degree in which they care about the
policy. Their intertemporal factor discount is  2 (0; 1]. A politician of type 
present an innity disutility from lying, in a perfect commitment setup.
6The assumption of uncertainty on voterspreferences is necessary for the equilibrium not
to unravel at the second election election.
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has utility function U(x; ) where x is the implemented policy and
U(x; ) = y   k(  x)2 if she wins the elections
U(x; ) = 0 otherwise.
Candidates R and L have their ideal policies in XR = [0; D] and XL = [ D; 0],
respectively. Due to party discipline, they are bounded to implement policies
within their respective policy spaces. Candidatesideal points are private knowl-
edge. Candidate R type, is drawn from the cdf F () on [0; D], with continuous
density, f() = F 0(), where f() > 0 on [0; D].
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Campaign. Candidates R and L announce a policy mR 2 XR and mL 2
XL, respectively.
2. First Election. Each citizen, taking in account the electoral campaign,
casts a vote for one of the two candidates.
3. Policy implementation. The elected politician implements a policy
from her policy space.7
4. Second Election. Each citizen observes the policy implemented by the
incumbent and casts a vote for one of the two candidates.
5. Policy implementation. The elected politician implements a policy
from her policy space.
The losing candidate is replaced by a candidate drawn from her original
distribution. At the second election the median voters ideal point is drawn
from the original distribution G.
7The introduction of electoral campaign in this stage would not alter the analysis.
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If an incumbent is conrmed in the o¢ ce, she will implement her favorite
policy, so her second period utility level will be simply y.
Let  be votersbeliefs about candidatespolicy preferences. and let sR (),
sL (), respectively, the policy she expects from a candidate R and from a can-
didate R if elected. Let mv be the median voters ideal policy.
She votes for candidateR if and only if E

(mv   sR ())2 j 

<E

(mv   sL ())2 j 

which is if and only if mv > e() where
e() =
1
2
E

s2R () j 
  E s2L () j 
E [sR () j ]  E [sL () j ]
The voter with ideal policy e() will be called the decisive voter. Every voter
with ideal point on the right of e() will vote for R and every voter with
ideal point on the left will vote for L. Politician L is elected with probabil-
ity () = 1 G(e()).
The next example presents the values of decisive voters for two di¤erent speci-
cations of the beliefs.
Example 1 In this example we compute the decisive voter in di¤erent infor-
mative situation that are of relevance for the papers
1. If voters believe that candidate R is of type  > 0, sR () =  and
candidate L is randomly drawn from her original distribution with density
f( x) on [ D; 0] then the decisive voter is:
e (; f ()) = 1
2
2   RD
0
2f () d
+
RD
0
f () d
In this case we denote by  ((; f ())) Rs probability of election.
2. Instead, if voters believe that candidateRs type belongs to interval (1; 2),
and it is drawn from the distribution F , while candidate L is randomly
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drawn from her original distribution then the decisive voter is
e ([1; 2] ; f ()) = 1
2
R 2
1
2f () d   (F (2)  F (1)
RD
0
2f () dR 2
1
f () d + (F (2)  F (1)
RD
0
f () d
1
2
R 2
1
2f () d   (F (2)  F (1)
RD
0
2f () dR 2
1
f () d + (F (2)  F (1)
RD
0
f () d
.
We denote by  ((1; 2; f ())) Rs probability of election.
3. Assume that voters believe that candidate R and L are of type  > 0 and
 < 0 respectively, then the decisive voter is:
e (; ; sR; sL) =
1
2
s2L ()  s2R ()
sL ()  sR () =
sL () + sR ()
2
From elementary Real Analysis follows that:
(i) e (3; f ()) > e ([1; 2] ; f ()) > e (0; f ()) if 3 > 2 > 1 > 0 > 0.
(ii) e (; f ()) is strictly increasing in . e ([1; 2] ; f ()) is strictly decreasing
in 1; 2 (separately).
(iii) lim1! 2 e ([1; 2] ; f ()) = e (2; f ()).
(iv) lim2!+1 e ([1; 2] ; f ()) = e (1; f ()).
(v) If sR (resp sL) is strictly increasing (resp decreasing) then e (; ; sR; sL) is
strictly increasing (resp decreasing) in  (resp ).
3 Electoral Equilibrium
Strategies
Candidatescampaign strategies are simply costless announcements of a pol-
icy. Formally the campaign strategies of candidates R and L are functions
mR : PR ! PR and mL : PL ! PL, respectively.
Once observed electoral campaign citizens have to casts their vote for one of
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the candidate, depending on their own ideal policies. A rst election voting
strategy is a function r1R : PRPLP !

0; 12 ; 1
	
, r1R(mR;mL; ) represents
the probability a median voter of type  2 P once candidates R and candidate
L have announced policies mR and mL, respectively. The median voter votes
for candidate L with probability 1  r1R.
The elected politician implements a policy from her policy space. As, at the
second elections he will be opposed to a randomly drawn candidate, there is no
loss of generality in considering strategies that depend only on her past electoral
announcement and on her type.
A policy strategy for an R incumbent is simply a function sR : PRPR !
PR, sR(mR; ) denotes the strategy implemented by a politician of ideal policy
, who has announced policy mR. A policy strategy for an L incumbent is
dened analogously.
After policy implementation citizens have decide if to conrm the incumbent
or to re her. There is no loss of generality in assuming that her decision will
depend only on the incumbent electoral campaign and on her performance.
If the incumbent is R the second election voting strategy is a function
r2R : PR  PR  P !

0; 12 ; 1
	
, r2R(mR; sR; ) represents the probability a
median voter of type  conrms the incumbent after has announced policy
mR and implemented policy sR. The second election voting strategy when the
incumbent is L is dened analogously and denoted by r2L.
Beliefs
Votersform their beliefs, at each information set depending on politicians
announcements and performances.
A belief at the rst election about candidates is a function 1 from the
Cartesian product of campaign messages PLPR to the set of joint probability
distributions on P 2. At the second election we assume that votersbeliefs de-
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pend only on the announcements and the policy of the incumbent, like voting
strategies. A belief at the second election is a function 2 from the Cartesian
product of campaign messages, rst stage voting outcomes, and policy outcomes
to the set of joint probability distributions on P 2.
An equilibrium is given by strategies and beliefs such that agentsstrategies
are optimal, given the beliefs.
Denition 1 An electoral equilibrium consists of strategies
(mR;mL; sR; sL; r1R; r2R; r2L) and beliefs (1; 2) such that
(1) For all  2 PR, mR() maximizes in m
DZ
 D
0Z
 D
r1R(m;mL(); )

y   k(  sR(;m)2

f()g()dd +
DZ
 D
0Z
 D
r1R(m;mL(); 1)r2R(m; sR(;m); 2)yf()g(1)g(2)dd1d2.
(2) For all (;m) 2 [0; D] [0; D], sR(;m) maximizes in s 2 [0; D]:
 k(  s)2 +
DZ
 D
r2R(mR () ; sj ; ))yg()d.
Analogous requirement are imposed on candidate Ls strategies
(3) For all (mR;mL; ) 2 [0; D] [ D; 0] [ D;D]:
r1R(mR;mL; ) = 1if E

(   sR())2 j 1(mR;mL)

< E

(   sL())2 j 1(mR;mL)

.
r1R(mR;mL; ) =
1
2 if E

(   sR())2 j 1(mR;mL)

= E

(   sL())2 j 1(mR;mL)

.
r1R(mR;mL; ) = 0 if E

(   sR())2 j 1(mR;mL)

> E

(   sL())2 j 1(mR;mL)

.
.(4) For all (m; s; ) 2 [0; D] [0; D] [ D;D]:
11
r2R(m; s; ) = 1 if E

(   R)2 j 2(mR; s)

< E

(   L)2 j 2(mR; s)

.
r2R(m; s; ) =
1
2 if E

(   R)2 j 2(mR; s)

= E

(   L)2 j 2(mR; s)

.
r2R(m; s; ) = 0 if E

(   R)2 j 2(mR; s)

> E

(   L)2 j 2(mR; s)

.
(5) Beliefs are computed using Bayesrule whenever possible.
Conditions (1) and (2) state that each candidates electoral and policy strate-
gies are sequentially optimal given her opponents strategies and votersdecision.
Conditions (3) and (4) state that votersdecisions are optimal at each election,
given their beliefs.
All along the paper we will devote our attention to symmetric equilibrium,
that have great intuitive appeal.
Denition 2 An electoral equilibrium is symmetric if mR () =  mL ( )
and sR (mR () ; ()) =   (sL ( ) ;mL ( )) for all  2 [0; D].
We next introduce notation for politicians expected probability of elections
given their strategy.
1R(mR;mL()) =
DZ
 D
0Z
 D
r1R(mR;mL(); )f()g()dd.
2R(mR; s) =
DZ
 D
r2R(m; s; )g()d.
1R and 2R are candidate Rs probabilities of winning the rst and the
second election, respectively. Dene analogous quantities for candidate L.
Taking in account that, that, if reelected a politician R of type  2 XR will
implement her ideal policy, her expected utility at equilibrium will be
1R

y   k(  xR)2 + 2Ry

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where arguments are omitted for simplicity.
We consider only equilibrium in which more centrists politicians implement
more centrist policies and are elected with higher probability.
Denition 3 An electoral equilibrium is monotonic if:
(R) 1R(mR();mL()) and 2R(mR(); sR ()) are decreasing on [0; D], and
sR (;mR ()) is increasing on [0; D]8 .
(L) 1L(mR();mL()) and 2L(mL(); sL ()) are increasing on [ D; 0] and
sL (;mL ()) is decreasing on [ D; 0].
Apart of the intuitive appeal of the notion of monotonic equilibrium there
is a further reason to consider them. We will prove that in every equilibrium
that is non monotonic (if any exists) there must be at least two candidates with
di¤erent ideal policy making di¤erent electoral announcements.
Given an electoral equilibrium f(mj ; sj) ; (r1j ; r2j); (1; 2)gj=R;L an elec-
toral pool is a set of candidates of di¤erent ideal policies making the same
electoral announcements. For every x 2 X, 
(x) = f : mR() = xg is an
electoral pool if it has positive measure.
A policy pool instead, is a set of incumbents of di¤erent ideal policies im-
plementing the same policy in their rst term. Let x; z 2 [0; D] and set

(x; z) = f : sR(; x) = zg. 
(mR(); sR(;mR())) is called a policy pool
if it has positive measure.
Let x; ; 0 2 [0; D],  6= 0. If 
(mR()) = fg or 
(mR(); sR(;mR())) =
fg we say that  separates in campaign or in policy, respectively. Other-
wise, we say that  pool. If f; 0g  
(mR()) or if f; 0g  
(mR(); sR(;mR()))
we say that  and 0 pool (together) in campaign or in policy, respectively. If

(mR()) = fg and 
(mR(); sR(;mR())) = fg for all  2 [0; D], then
8Unless otherwise stated, decreasing and increasing will stay for weakly decreasing and
weakly increasing, respectively.
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the equilibrium is fully separating. If only one of the two conditions holds,
then the equilibrium will be said separating in campaign and in policy,
respectively.
Analogous denitions hold for candidate L.
We devote our attention to symmetric monotonic equilibria. Thus, it is suf-
cient to consider only the strategies of one of the two candidates. We will
analyze Rs strategies omitting the subscript R, when there is no risk of am-
biguity. Furthermore we use s () for s (m(); ), 1() for 1(mR();mL())
and 2() for 2(m(); s()), on the equilibrium path.
Monotonic equilibria have interesting connectivity properties: if candidates
of di¤erent types 1 < 2 announce the same policy then every candidate ,
with 1 <  < 2 will make the same campaign and will implement the same
policy after the rst electoral term. Furthermore they will be elected with the
same probability at both elections. The easy proof is omitted.
Remark 1 Let f(mj ; sj) ; (r1j ; r2j); (1; 2)gj=R;L be a monotonic equilibrium.
(1) For each  2 [0; D], 
(m(); s()) is connected, hence it is an interval.
(2) If s() = s(0) then 1() = 1(0) and 2() = 2(0).
There is no loss of generality in assuming that candidates having the same prob-
ability of election at the rst stage use the same electoral campaign (we assume
candidates only use pure strategies). Under this assumption, we can state (2)
as.
(3) s() = s(0)) m() = m(0).
Then monotonicity gets rid of unlikely equilibria where centrists and mod-
erates present di¤erent electoral platforms, but extremists pool with centrists.
We say that the electoral campaign is signicative at equilibrium if there exist
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politicians of di¤erent ideal policies inducing di¤erent beliefs through electoral
campaign. Formally:
Denition 4 The electoral campaign is informative at equilibrium if there
are two electoral messages m = mR (), m0 = mR (0), m00 = mL () for some
; 0 2 [0; D] and  2 [ D; 0] such that 1 ( j m;m00) 6= 1 ( j m0;m00)
4 Preliminary results
The rst result provides an additional reason that makes monotonic equilibrium
a reasonable choice in this environment. Any electoral equilibrium is, locally,
monotonic. In all electoral pools, equilibrium policies are monotonic and second
stage election probabilities are decreasing.
Lemma 1 Let x 2 [0; D] be a campaign message. In all symmetric equilibria:
(i) s(; x), is increasing in  on 
(x).
(ii) 2(x; s(; x)) is decreasing in  on 
(x)9 .
Symmetric claims hold for candidate L.
Both claims are emptily true if the type sending message x is separating.
Otherwise the rst claim is easily proved using incentive compatibility. In order
to prove the second one we use (i) of Example 1
From Lemma 1, it follows:
Corollary 1 In any non monotonic equilibrium the electoral campaign is sig-
nicative.
We next prove that in any monotonic equilibrium, if the types (1; 2) belong
to the same policy pool, then there is a set of unused policies. This result will
9Property (i) holds in any electoral equilibrium, either symmetric or asymmetric.
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be frequently used. It implies that the policy function has a discontinuity, at
the end of any policy pool.
Lemma 2 Let x 2 [0; D] be a policy and let 1 < 2. Assume that s() = x <
D for all  2 (1; 2), but s() 6= x for all  > 2 then there exists h > 0 such
that policies in (x; x+ h) are not used or s() = x on (2; D].
If the incumbents with ideal policies in (1; 2) are implementing x, while
agents with  > 2 are implementing a di¤erent policy then there must be a
discontinuity in votersbeliefs. A discontinuity in the policy function is needed
to prevent an agent of type  > 2 from mimicking a more centrist politician.
The next result shows that the threat of reelection is e¤ective on the incum-
bent. In order not to decrease her chances of reelection, she will implement a
policy which is more centrist than her favorite one.
Lemma 3 In a monotonic equilibrium, if s () is separating on [1; 2) then
s () <  on [1; 2).
The intuition for this result is simple. If s () >  then an agent of type
s () would prot from imitating  because she would increase her election
perspectives and she would implement her favorite policy. The result does not
preclude that s(D) = D.
It follows that in any monotonic equilibrium some candidates types are
pooling in order to increase the probability of winning the elections. This fact
implies that a full separating equilibrium does not exist.
Proposition 2 There exists no policy separating monotonic equilibrium. Hence
there is no full separating equilibrium.
Proof. Otherwise, from Lemma 3, s(0) < 0. Any full separating equilibrium is
equivalent to a monotonic equilibrium so the second claim follows from the rst
one.
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We have assumed that right wing politician can only implement right wing
policies. The result holds also we allow right wing candidates to implement left
wing policies.
If s () is increasing then it has at most a countable set of discontinuity points
and it is di¤erentiable almost everywhere (see Royden 1988). There is no loss
of generality in assuming that the electoral campaign is monotonic increasing
and that m() =  when type  is separating, and that agents having the same
probability of being elected at the rst election make the same announcement.
Denote by 1; 2; :::k; ::: where 0  1 < 2 < ::: < k < :::  D the
discontinuity points of s. The intervals (i; i+1) i  1 will be called continuity
regions of s.
Not surprisingly, if the politicians belonging to the same continuity region
implement the same policy then also their electoral announcement is the same.
The result will be repeatedly used in providing a characterization of SMD1
equilibria. The result holds for any monotonic equilibrium, independently on
any renement.
Lemma 4 Assume that, for some i = 1; 2; :::; k; :::, the types in (i; i+1) belong
the same policy pool. Then they belong to the same campaign pool.
The proof of the results is by contradiction. The intuition is simple: if it was
not the case extremists of the continuity region (i; i+1) would nd protable
to mimicking more centrists candidates.
5 The SMD1 renement
The renement used in thispaper builds on the one introduced by Bernheim
and Severinov (2003) and studied also in Kartik (2005). It develops the same
basic intuition that led Cho and Kreps (1987) to introduce the D1 criterion.
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The receiver should not attribute the deviation to a particular type if there is
some di¤erent type that is willing to deviate for a larger set of responses. The
MD1 Criterion strengthens the D1 criterion and applies the test to beliefs about
policies that are never used in equilibrium, taking in account the monotonicity
of equilibrium messages and the sequential release of information.
The lowest and the highest response an incumbent can expect after imple-
menting a policy x are, in this setup, the highest and lowest probability of
election following policy x. We denote them by lR(x) and hR(x) respectively.
For all x 2 [0; D] set
lR(x) = sup
sR()>x
2R() if sR () > x for some  2 [0; D]
lR(x) = 2R(D; f()) otherwise
and
hR(x) = inf
sR()<x
2R(), if sR () < x for some  2 [0; D]
hR(x) = (0; f()) otherwise
Analogous bounds are symmetrically dened for candidate L. Imagine that
an incumbent implements an out of equilibrium policy x, lR(x) is the supre-
mum of the probabilities of elections of candidates that, at equilibrium, use
policies, that are more extremist than x. Similarly, hR(x) is the inmum of
the probabilities of elections of candidates that, at equilibrium, use more extrem-
ist policies. Lemma 2 implies that lR(x) < hR(x) for all out of equilibrium
policies x with x < s(D). For all x 2 [s (D) ; D], lR(x) = hR(x) = 2(D).10
10 If the D1 criterion was used [lR(x); hR(x)] = [(D; f()); (0; f())] .
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Denition 5 An electoral equilibrium satises the sequential monotonic D1
(SMD1) criterion if
(1) It is monotonic
(2) Let m = (mR(R);mL(

L)) for some (

R; 

L) 2 PR  PL. Let x 2 [0; D]
with  (x j R; L) = 0 for all (R; L) 2 PRPL. If there exist some 0 2 [0; D]
such that, if  2 [lR(x); hR(x)] and  2 [0; D]:
1R()
 
y   k(x  )2 + y  1R()  y   k(sR()  )2 + 2()y =)
1R()(y   k(x  0)2 + y) > 1R(0)
 
y   k(sR(0)  0)2 + 2(0)y

then (0;  j m;x) = 1.
Analogous requirement is symmetrically imposed on candidate L.
Requirement (2) extends the monotonicity requirements to out of equilib-
rium beliefs. If an elected o¢ cial implements out of equilibrium policy x, she
should expect of being reelected with probability between lR (x) and hR (x).
The renement assign positive probability only to those types who benet most
from this deviation. Di¤erently from the monotonic D1 criterion, in assessing
her beliefs, the receiver takes also in account the information provided by the
campaign, which can have an inuence on the probability of winning the rst
electoral competition. In this electoral game the politician in deviating will take
in account both the e¤ect on the rst election, and on the second one.
For all ;  set
T (; ; x; 2) = 1()
 
y   k(x  )2 + 2y
 1()  y   k(s ()  )2 + 2 () y .
T (; ; x; 2) is the gain, for type  in mimicking type  campaign and imple-
menting policy x.
Condition (2) of Denition 5 can be written in this case as
Let m = (mR(R);mL(

L)) and let x 2 [0; D] with  (x j R; L) = 0 for all
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(R; L) 2 PRPL. If there exists a non-empty set of types 
  [0; D] such that,
for each  =2 
, if there exists some 0 2 
 such that, for all  2 [l(x); h(x)]
T (; ; x; 2)  0 =) T (0; ; x; 2) > 0
then (;  j mR; x) = R()f(), where suppR ( j mR; x))  
.
In particular if  is the unique maximizer of T (; ; x; h(x)) then voters
must assign probability 1 to type  when they observe an incumbent who has
been elected presenting an electoral platform mR() and implements policy x.
6 Equilibrium characterization and existence
Every SMD1 equilibrium is characterized by a cut-o¤ type such all politician
with ideal point to the left of it implement the most centrist policy, while the
others separate in policy. In this equilibria centrists act as pure o¢ ce seek-
ers. More extremists candidates, despite the electoral concerns cannot bear to
implement a policy that is too faraway from the ideal one.
Theorem 3 Any SMD1 is essentially equivalent11 to an equilibrium in which,
for all i, there exists  2 (0; D] such that
(i) sR() = 0 on [0; ]
(ii) If  < D then sR() is separating on (; D] and sR(D) = D.
Lets provide an intuition for the role played by the SMD1 criterion in the
proof. Let xi be the most extremist policy implemented by an incumbent with
ideal policy in (i; i+1) then and if xi+1 is the most centrist policy implemented
by an incumbent with ideal policy in (i+1; i+2). From Lemma 2 xi < xi+1.
11Essentially equivalent means that it is equal, excepted, at most a zero measure set of
types.
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The SMD1 criterion implies that, if voters observe a policy in (xi; xi+1) they
must deduce that the incumbent politician has ideal point i+1. We use this
result to proof that if agents in (i; i+1) pool then politicians in (i+1; i+2)
separate and that if politicians in (i; i+1) separate then i+1 = D.
Theorem 3 and Lemma 4 together restrict all SMD1 equilibria to only four
categories:
(i) Babbling: equilibria in which all types pool in campaign and rst-term
policy.
Insert Figure 1 here
(ii) Campaign irrelevant but policy signicative equilibria, in which all
types send the same electoral message, but the more extremist types separate
in rst-term policy.
Insert Figure 2 here
(iii) Polarized campaign equilibria in which centrists and extremists belong
di¤erent campaign pools centrists implement the same policy and extremists
separate in rst-term policy
Insert Figure 3 here
(iv) Partially separating campaign equilibria where centrists pool on the
same electoral promise and on the same policy and extremists separate both in
campaign and in rst-term policy.
Insert Figure 4 here
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We nally prove the existence of SMD1 equilibria and we rene the charac-
terization. The larger is the degree in which candidates cares about the policy
they implement, the larger are the possibilities of relevant electoral campaign.
We prove that partially separating campaign equilibrium do not exist.
Theorem 4 A SMD1 equilibrium exists. There exist k0 < k1 < k2 and there
exists strictly decreasing functions 1 (k) ; 2 (k) with
limk!1 i(k) = 0 for i = 1; 2; 3, such that
(i) For k  k0 all MD1 equilibria are fully pooling, which is m() = m(0) and
s() = 0 for all  2 [0; D]. If k > k0 such equilibria are not SMD1.
(ii) For k  k0 there exists an SMD1 equilibria such that m() = m(0) for all
 2 [0; D], s() = 0 for all  2 [0; 1(k)], s () is separating on ((k); D].
(iii) For k  k1 there exists an SMD1 equilibrium in which m() = m(0) for
all  2 [0; 2(k)) and m() = m(2(k)) 6= m(0) for all  2 [2(k); D], s() = 0
for all  2 [0; 2(k)] and s () is separating on [2(k); D].
Any SMD1 equilibrium is essentially equivalent to one of the equilibria described
above.
It is interesting to observe that if an high degree of policy concern makes cam-
paign relevant, it makes more di¢ cult for politicians to stick to their promises..
When k !1, 2 (k)! 0 so a larger proportion of politician separate in policy.
The babbling equilibrium is always an equilibrium. When candidates care
enough about the policy they implement if elected extremists candidate are
willing to reduce their chances of elections in order to implement their favorite
policy, so the babbling equilibrium does no longer satises the SMD1 criterion.
The rest of the proof is constructive.
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Observe that  = argmax0 1(0))
h
y   k (s(0)  )2 + 2 (0) y
i
. So,
almost everywhere:
01()
h
y   k (s()  )2 + 2 () y
i
+1()) [ 2ks0()) (s()  ) + 02 () y] = 0
(1)
In particular, if all agents in (0; 00) pool on the same campaign but separate
in policy, (1()))
0
= 0 and
[ 2ks0()) (s()  ) + 02 () y] = 0 on (0; 00) (2)
In a SMD1 equilibrium S(D) = D so the problem dened by 2 and S (D) = D
has not in general a solution, because does not satises the Lipschitz condition
in a neighborhood of D, and nothing guarantees the unicity of the solution. In
the appendix we proof that the problem has a unique increasing solution which
satises S(D) = D and s (x) < x for x < D. Actually it could be proved that
the problem has a unique decreasing solution which satises S(D) = D and
s (x) > x for x < D.
If some candidates separated in campaign then Equation 1 would be an
integro-di¤erential equation of the form
ds
d j=
=
 bU3 (s () ; ; ; s ())bU1 (s () ; ; ; s ())
with nal condition s (D) = D. In the Appendix we prove that bU3 (s () ; ; ; s ()) <
0 and that bU1 (s (D) ; D;D; s ()) < 0 if s (D) = D. No solution s to the the
problem can then be increasing.
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6.1 Asymptotically separating equilibria
Theorem 4 proves that there is no equilibria in which an interval of politi-
cians separate in campaign that are robust to the SMD1 criterion. Nevertheless
monotonic equilibria where some politicians separate in campaign in general ex-
ist. In the Appendix we describe a family of such equilbria, that are very similar
to the ones described in Theorem 4, but with s (D) < D. Asymptotically, for
k !1 such equilibria converge to a fully revealing equilibrium.
Insert Figure 5 here
Proposition 5 Let f and g be C1. There exists k such that for all k  k
a monotonic equilibrium with partially separating campaign exists. There exists
 (k) 2 (0:D) m() = m(0) for all  2 [0; (k)) and m() =  for all  2
[2(k); D], s() = 0 for all  2 [0; 2(k)] and s () is separating on [(k); D].
Such equilibria converge to a completely separating equilibrium: limk!1 (k) =
0.
7 Discussion
Theorem 4 relies on the credible threat imposed on incumbent reelection per-
spectives. In the real world electoral disappointment does have an e¤ect on
electors. The model we presents does not capture this aspect because the idio-
syncratic shocks dening median voter exact position is independent across pe-
riods and uncorrelated to actions. Electoral disappointment can be introduced
as a shift of voters distribution, correlated with the degree of electoral fulll-
ment. To make things simple as possible assume that median voter distribution
is shifted to left in the case of an R incumbent, or to the right in the case of an L
incumbent of a x factor x > 0, if the elected o¢ cer deviates from the expected
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policy(ies)12 . The reader can easily verify that the claim of Theorem 4 holds
even if we impose votersbeliefs about the two candidates to be independent.
For x  D   D
2 RD
0
f()d
D+
RD
0
f()d
the proof of the result would not change at all.
Otherwise the value of k0; k1; k2 needed would be larger as it would harder to
induce extremists not to pool in campaign. Similar result can be obtained also
through a shock which continuously depends on the distance between expected
policy and implemented one.
The SMD1 renement applies only to zero probabilities policies. It is strong
enough to shrink dramatically the set of possible equilibria.
The claim of Proposition 2 relies on the boundedness of the type space.
Allowing for an unbounded type space can lead to full separation in sender-
receiver games with both costly messages and cheap talk (see Kartik 2005).
It is not the case here. We would obtain full separation in policy, but total
pooling in campaign. The reason is that, asymptotically, candidates utilities is
null, so it is the e¤ect of career concerns. Very extremist candidates would be
incomparably better o¤ by maximizing their rst election probability.
8 Conclusions
The paper has presented a model of electoral competition under incomplete
information in which candidates care about both o¢ ce and the policy. It in-
troduces incomplete information and the dynamic aspects of a double election
and it proves that electoral campaign is able to convey relevant information
to voters even when campaigning is not costly. The work opens a possibility
for endogenous commitment. The result is driven by both candidatescareer
concern and the threat of failed reelection. The impossibility for candidates to
sustain policies that are too faraway from their ideal ones shapes then policy
12Excluding the case of a totally out of equilibrium policy, which denes the MD1 criterion.
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they carry out in the rst term. Innovating on Harrington (1993), we nd that
not only reelection pressure but also policy motivation can give relevance to
electoral promises, and they both concur in shaping implemented policies. Cen-
tristselectoral opportunism cannot be eliminated. It can be only be reduced if
candidatesdegree of policy implication is high enough. This is consistent with
the empirical literature which estimates that a part (even if relevant) of policies
are responsive to electoral compromises.
The investigation can be extended in di¤erent directions. On the one hand
toward the study of more complex models of competition. In our model the
" world ends" after the second election. So just before there is no place for
meaningful electoral competition before the last election. Allowing for repeated
interactions should make it relevant. A suitable model would be the one of
an overlapping generation of politicians that can stay in the o¢ ce for a xed
number of terms. The threat to reelection imposed on the incumbent would
probably be reinforced, and so the degree of commitment.
On the other hand, a partially unexplored eld is the nature itself of electoral
campaign. It is usually modeled as a one-shot policy announcements (either
costly or cheap). Despite of it, in the real world, electoral campaigns are complex
and longer interactions between electors and politicians. Voters are continuously
exposed to announcements. Politicians invest many resources in polls to discover
electorsintentions and tastes. Parties try both to send reliable messages and to
get information about electors. The empirical literature considers these aspects
as an important part of the process of information transmission ((see for instance
Alvarez 1998), while theoretical investigation about such phenomena is little
and not conclusive (see Meirowitz 2005, who studies polls manipulability by
electors). Models of repeated and costless communication (see Krishna and
Morgan 2004) could provide useful tools to deal with the topic.
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QTOappendix
Proofs
Preliminary Results on Monotonic Equilibria
Proof of Lemma 1: Let 0   < 0. Set t = s(; x), t0 = s(0; x),
 = 2(x; s(; x)) and 0 = 02(x; s(
0; x)).
(i) The proof of the claim is by contradiction. Assume that t0 < t. From
incentive compatibility it follows:
 k(t  )2 + y   k(t0   )2 + 0y.
 k(t  0)2 + 0y   k(t  0)2 + y.
Which is:
(   0) y + k (t0   )2   (t  )2  0.
(0   ) y + k (t  0)2   (t0   0)02  0.
Summing up the two inequalities:
(t0   )2   (t  )2 + (t  0)2   (t0   0)  0.
Simplifying:
(  0) (t  t0)  0
that yields a contradiction because  < 0.
(ii) The proof of the claim is by contradiction. Assume that  > 0. From (i)
and from the denition of monotonic equilibrium it follows that it cannot be
the case that  and 0 belong to di¤erent policy pools or that  and 0 belong
the same policy pool or that 0 pools with some other type while  separate.
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It must be the case that  pools and 0 separates. From Remark 1, the pool 
belongs to is an interval (1; 2) (or [1; 2], or (1; 2], or [1; 2)). In such a
case the decisive voter for  is:
e() =
1
2
R 2
10
2f () d   (F (2)  F (1))
RD
0
2f () dR 2
1
f () d + (F (2)  F (1))
RD
0
f () d
while the decisive voter for 0 >  is:
e(0) =
1
2
(0)2   RD
0
2f () d
0 +
RD
0
f () d
> e ()
which yields a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2: From Remark 1, part (3) m() constant on (1; 2).
There is no loss of generality in assuming that (1; 2) is the interior of the
corresponding policy pool. From monotonicity s(2)  x. First, consider the
case s(2) > x. Then policies in (x; s(2)) are not used in equilibrium.
Now let s(2) = x and set bx = lim &2s () = inf >2s (). Observe
that s() > x for  > 2. By contradiction, suppose that bx = x. Set
1" = 1(2+"), 1 = 10, 2" = 2(2+"), 2 = 20. It must be the case that
2" < 2 and 0 < 1"  1 for all " > 0. The di¤erence 2   2" is bounded
below by some positive constant c. Furthermore, (s (2 + ")  (2 + "))2 >
(x  2   ")2 for all " > 0 Otherwise, 2 + " could protably deviate by mim-
icking 2.
For all 0 < " < " set
L(") = 1

y   k (x  2   ")2 + 2y

 1"
n
y   k [s (2 + ")  (2 + ")]2 + 2"y
o
L(") is the net loss or the net gain to type 2 + " from imitating type 2. At
equilibrium L(")  0 for all " > 0.
L(")  1k
h
(s (2 + ")  (2 + "))2   (x  2   ")2
i
+ 1"(2   2")y 
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1k
h
(s (2 + ")  (2 + "))2   (x  2   ")2
i
+ 1"cy.
inf">0 1k
h
(s (2 + ")  (2 + "))2   (x  2   ")2
i
= 0, then for " small enough
L(") > 0, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3: We rst prove that s()   for all  2 [1; 2].
By contradiction, assume that s() > . Consider type 0 = s() > . By
monotonicity s(0) > s () because agents in [1; 2) separate. But then 0
could protably imitate : the probabilities of election at both stages weakly
increase because of monotonicity and she would not pay policy costs.
We ow prove the second claim. By contradiction, suppose that s(b) = b for some
b 2 (1; 2). Let "  0 and set 1" = 1 (b+ "; ), 1 = 10, 2" = 2R (b+ ")
2 = 20. As s is strictly increasing 2" < 2 and 1"  1for all " > 0. Let
L(") be the net loss or the net gain to type b + " from imitating type b as
dened in the proof of Lemma 2. At equilibrium L(")  0 for all " > 0.
L(") = 1
 
y   k"2 + 2y
  1" ny   k [s (b+ ")  (b+ ")]2 + 2"yo
L(")  1
 
y   k"2 + 2y
   1" fy + 2"yg  1"  k"2 + (2   2") y,
for some xed " > 0. 1" > 0 and 2" = (b+ "; f()).
Set B(") = 1"
 k"2 + (2   2") y, then:
dB(")
d" =  1"
 
2k"+ d2"d"

and
dB(")
d" j"=0 =  1"

d(b+";f())
d" j"=0

> 0 from Example 1.
As B(0) = 0, then B(") > 0 for " small enough. But then type b + " could
protably mimic type b, for " small enough, yielding a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4: Let 0   < 0 < 00. By contradiction, assume
that some types in (; 0)  (i; i+1) send message m and that the types in
(0; 00)  (i; i+1) send messagem0. Let 0+" imitate type 0 ". The gain in
the probability of being elected at the rst stage is bounded below by a strictly
positive constant. The gain in second election probability is non negative. For
"! 0 the loss in policy term goes to 0 by continuity, so the deviation would be
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protable for " small enough.
Equilibrium characterization and existence
When there is no risk of ambiguity we omit the arguments ; x; 2 and we
write simply T () for T (; ; x; 2) and T 0 () for @T@ (; ; x; 2).
So we have:
T 0 () = 2k [1() (  s ())  1() (  x)] . (3)
From Lemma 2 follows that if some types (0; 00)  (i; i+1) are in the
same policy pool then (i; i+1) is included in the same policy pool. So if (i; )
with   i+1 are separating then types in (i; i+1) are all separating.
Lemma 5 In every SMD1 equilibrium
(i) s(0) = 0
(ii) If types in (i; i+1) are in the same policy pool then agents in (i+1; i+2)
separate.
(iii) If types in (i; 1+1) separate then i+1 = D
(iv) If D is separating in policy s (D) = D.
Proof: For every i  1 set si = lim%i s () and set si = lim&i s ().
Set s0 = 0, s0 = s(0) sD = lim%D s () and set sD = s(D)  D. By denition
si < si for i = 1; 2:::: and s0  s0, sD  sD. From equilibrium monotonic-
ity it follows that for all i  1 and for all x 2  si; si T1 (; ; x; ) < 0 if
 > i and T1 (; ; x; ) > 0 for  < i. Then from (i j m(); x) = 1. For
x 2  s0; s0 and  > 0, T1 (; ; x; ) < 0 so (i j m(); x) = 1. Finally, for all
x 2  sD; sD [ (sD; D), T1 (; ; x; ) > 0 then for all x 2  sD; sD [ (sD; D),
(D j m(); x) = 1.
(i) By contradiction, suppose that s(0) > 0. From the result above, for " small
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enough (0 j m(0); ") = 1. Then " can protably deviate by sending (m(0); ").
(ii) Let s = s() for all  2 (i; i+1). By contradiction assume that the types
in (i+1; i+2) are pooling. For " small enough i+1+" can protably deviate by
implementing policy si , with  small enough (i+1 j m(i+1+"); si ) = 1,
a contradiction. It is because, from the continuity of x on (i+1; i+2), the gain
in second election probability is bounded below by a positive constant, while
loss in policy term is of order 2.
(iii) If types in (i; i+1) are separating and types in (i+1; i+2) are pool-
ing then type i+1 + " can protably deviate by sending (m(i+1   "); si   ).
(i+1 j (m(i+1   "); si   )) = 1. For  small enough, the loss in policy term
is compensated by the gain in election probability. If types in (; i+1) are pool-
ing then, for " small enough i+1 + " can protably deviate by implementing
policy si   , with  small enough. (i+1 j m(i+1 + "); si   ) = 1 The loss
in policy term is of order 2, the gain in second election probability is bounded
below by a positive constant.
(iv) By contradiction let s(D) < D. For all x 2 [s (D) ; D], lR(x) = hR(x) =
2(D). So,once observed x, the voters must assign positive probability to type
 = D. Then any type  = D  ", for " small enough can protably deviate by
implementing policy x = D   ". The loss in second term election probability
would be at most innitesimal (2 is continuous in a neighborhood of D), the
gain in policy term is bounded below by min[i;D] k (  s ())2 > 0, from (iii).
Proof of Theorem 3: It su¢ ces to show that  > 0. By contradiction,
assume that  = 0. In this the equilibrium would have a monotonic electoral
equilibrium with separating policies contradicting Proposition 2.
If 2 is C1 and strictly decreasing the problem dened by the di¤erential
equation 1 and the terminal condition S(D) = D has a unique solution such
that s() <  on [0; D). The result follows directly from Lemma 6 below.
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Furthermore s(0) < 0. Otherwise the graph of s should crosses the diagonal at
some  > 0. In this case lim!+ s0() =1. This is impossible: if the graph
cross the diagonal it must be from below because s () <  on (0; D).
Lemma 6 Let f be a strictly negative C1 functions dened on [0; D]B where
B is a real interval such that [0; D] $ B  ( 1; D]. Then there exists a solu-
tion, dened on [0; D], to the following ordinary di¤erential equation problem:
8>>>><>>>>:
y0 (y   x) = f (x; y)
y(D) = D
y(x)  x
Furthermore, if there exists  > 0 such that fy (x; y)  0 for every (x; y) 2
f(x; y) 2 B : jj(x; y)  (D;D)jj < ; y < x; g, then the solution is unique.
Proof: The problem does not satisfy the local Lipschitz conditions in a
neighborhood of D. The existence part of the Proof is by approximation. Let
y" be the solution of the following Cauchy problem:8><>: y
0 (x) (y (x)  x) = f (x; y (x))
y(D) = D   "
Here the local existence and uniqueness theorem applies. In order to prove that
y"(x) can be extended to the interval [0; D] it su¢ ces to show that there exists
no x 2 [0; D), such that limx!x+ y0"(x) = 1. In this case the extension the-
orem applies. First observe that if y" is dened and C1in the interval (x; D] :
From y"(D) = D   " and y0" (x) (y" (x)  x) < 0 it follows that y0" (x) > 0
and y" (x) < x on (x; D]. If limx!x+ y0"(x) = 1, then limx!x+ y"(x) =
x. It follows that, for  > 0 small enough, y0" (x) > 2 on (x
; x + ]. Let
0 < 
0
< . By the intermediate value theorem y" (x + )   (x + ) =
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y"
 
x + 0
    x + 0 +  y0"  x + 00  1    0 for some 0 < 00 <  but
then y" (x + )   (x + ) > y"
 
x + 0
    x + 0 +    0. Let 0 ! 0.
From the previous observations it follows that the RHS converges to 2 while
the LHS is independent of 0 < . Then y" (x + )   (x + ) >  > 0, which
yields a contradiction. y" (x) is C1 with respect to " on [0; D) (Pontryagin 196),
ch. 23). y" (D) ! D for " ! 0. By contradiction, assume that, for some
x 2 [0; D), y"(x) is not converging for "! 0. In particular, for some 0 <  < D,
the Ascoli-Arzelá Theorem does not apply in [0; D   ]. The family fy"g">0
is uniformly bounded in [0; D   ] (because y"(x)  x on [0; D   ]). It must
be the case that fy"g">0 it is not uniformly continuous then sup">0 y0" = 1.
As above, it follows that y" (x) > x for some " and some x 2 [0; D   ], a
contradiction. So y" converges uniformly to some y in each interval [0; D   ].
Each y" satises y0 (x) (y (x)  x) = f (x; y (x)), and y0" converges uniformly to
some continuous z. Then y0 = z. The local existence and uniqueness theorem
implies that y is independent of the choice of . The function y is dened and
di¤erentiable on [0; D) and satises y0 (x) (y (x)  x) = f (x; y) because each y"
satises it. y(x) < x on [0; D) otherwise y0 (x) ! 1 for x ! x, some x
against the uniform convergence of y0". The existence part is proved by setting
y(D) = limx!D y(x) = 0.
Now we prove uniqueness. Let f such that that, for some  > 0, fy (x; y)  0 for
every (x; y) 2 f(x; y) 2 B : jj(x; y)  (D;D)jj < ; y < x; g. By contradiction,
assume that y1 and y2 two di¤erent solutions of the problem. The local exis-
tence and uniqueness theorem implies that the graphs of the function cross only
at (D;D). There is no loss of generality then in assuming that y1 (x) < y2 (x) on
[0; D). Then, for some  small enough y01 (x) > y
0
2 (x) for all x 2 [D   ;D). For
x next to D, we have y02 (x) (y2 (x)  x)  y01 (x) (y1 (x)  x) = f (x; y1 (x)) 
f (x; y2 (x)) with at least one strict inequality. This yields a contradiction be-
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cause y2 solves the ODE problem.
Proof of Theorem 4: We will always assume that, whenever beliefs are
not imposed by Bayesian, consistency or by the MD1 renement, if a candidate
announces a policy and implements a policy that is expected from a di¤erent
type, then the median voter will not conrm her. This is consistent as we allow
beliefs to be correlated (actually it is su¢ cient that the incumbent is voted with
probability 2 (D; f ()). Let us consider the di¤erent possibilities.
(a) The rst case is  = D so that the equilibrium is equivalent to an equi-
librium in which all types are pooling together at 0 a and at both stages they
are elected with probability 12 , and after the rst election all pool on policy 0.
The payo¤ for type  is 12
 
1 + 2

y   k2. This is an MD1 equilibrium if and
only if 12
 
1 + 2

y   kD2  12y and 2y   kD2  y2 (D), otherwise type D
could protably separate by implementing policy D (at the campaign and at
the policy stage, respectively ) which is as far as:
k  min

y
2D2
; y

1
2
  2 (D)

= y

1
2
  2 (D)

= k0
where 2 (D) is the probability a candidate is elected at the second stage if
perceived as type D and the other candidate is selected from FL, which is with
probability
h
1 G

1
2
D2 RD
0
2f()d
D+
RD
0
f()d
i
< 12 , because of the symmetry of G. For
k < k0 a (continuous of) pooling equilibrium exists but it does not satises the
MD1 criterion.
(b) The second case is that  < D, and all types pool at the rst stage.
In such a case all types are elected with probability 12 at the rst election. At
the second stage type  2 [0; ] is elected with probability:
2 ([0; 
]) = [1 G (e ([0; ] ; f ()))]
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where:
e ([0; ] ; f ()) = 1
2
R 
0
2f () d   F () RD
0
2f () dR 
0
f () d + F ()
RD
0
f () d
.
e ([0; ] ; f ()) is the decisive voter when the types in [0; ] are pooling and
matched to a challenger selected from the original distribution. Elementary
analysis shows that D < e ([0; ] ; f ()) < D for  > 0 and e ([0; ] ; f ()) it is
strictly increasing. Furthermore, lim!0+ e ([0; ] ; f ()) =   12
RD
0
2f()dRD
0
f()d
2
[ D; 0]. lim!D  e ([0; ] ; f ()) = 0. So 2 () is strictly decreasing and
di¤erentiable in .
A type  2 (; D] is elected at the second stage with probability:
2 () = 1 G (e (; f ()))
where:
e (; f ()) = 1
2
2   RD
0
2f () d
+
RD
0
f () d
.
We have  D < e ([0; ] ; f ()) < e (; f ()) < D. So 2 () < 2 ([0; ]) for
 > . e (; f ()) is strictly increasing on (; D]. lim!D  e (; f ()) =
1
2
D2 RD
0
2f()d
D+
RD
0
f()d
2 (0; D). So 2 () is strictly decreasing and continuously
di¤erentiable in .
If s() is separating on (; D], it must satisfy:
2ks0()) (s()  ) = 02 () y
with the nal condition s(D) = D. Furthermore,  = 1(k) > 0 must be
indi¤erent between separating and pooling, then:

1
2
+ 2 ([0; 
])

y   k2 =

1
2
+ 2 (
)

y   k (s()  )2 .
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Set H() =
 
1
2 + 2 ([0; ])

y k2    12 + 2 ()  y+k (s()  )2. s (0) <
0. So H(0) > 0. H (D) = [2 ([0; D])  2 (D)] y   kD2 =

1
2   2 (D)

y  
kD2  0 if k  k0. H 0 () < 0 = d2([0;])d y   2ks () < 013 . It is easily seen
that s (1(k)) > 0 because if s() = 0 then H() > 0.
Through implicit di¤erentiation
dH(1(k))
dk
= H(1(k))
d1(k)
dk
+Hk(1(k)) = 0
so
d1(k)
dk
=
 Hk(1(k))
H(1(k))
=   s
2 (1(k))  21(k)s (1(k))
d2([0;1(k)])
d y   2ks (1(k))
< 0
Then 1(k) is strictly decreasing in k.
From H(1(k)) = 0 follows 1(k)! 0 as k !1.
(c) In the third case there are two campaign pools [0; ) and(; D], with the
second separating in policies. [0; ) typeselection probabilities are
1 ([0; 
]) =
1
2
F () + (1  F ()) [1 G (e ([0; ) ; s))] .
and 2 ([0; )) ; respectively, where (e ([0; ) ; s)) is the decisive voter of pool
[0; ) against pool (; D]: her location is:
1
2
(1  F ()) R 
0
2f () d   F () RD
 s
2()f () d
(1  F ()) R 
0
2f () d + F ()
RD
 s()f () d
which is, simplifying:
Observe that G (e ([0; ) ; s))  12 , because e ([0; ) ; (; D])  0.
(; D]s election probabilities are:
1 ((
; D]) = (F ()) (1 G (e (s; [0; )))) + 1
2
(1  F ())
13Because s solves the di¤erential equation.
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and 2 (), respectively, where:
e ((; D] ; [0; )) =
1
2
F ()
RD
 s
2 () f () d   (1  F ()) R 
0
2f () d
F ()
RD
 s () f () d + (1  F ())
R 
0
2f () d
From the symmetry of the distribution G, G (e ([0; ) ; (; D])) =
1 G (e ((; D] ; [0; ))) = 1 G  12 , so:
1 ((
; D]) = (F ()) (G (e ([0; ) ; s))) +
1
2
(1  F ())
and 1 ([0; ]) = 1 ((; D]) + 12  G (e ((; D] ; [0; )))  1 ((; D]).
As above, on (; D] s must satisfy:
2ks0()) (s()  ) = 02 () y
and  must satisfy:
1 [0; 
]

1 + 2 ([0; 
]) y   k2 =
1 ((
; D])
h
1 + 2 (
) y   k (s()  )2
i
Set H(; k) =

(1 ([0; 
]) + 2 ([0; ])) y   k2
	 
 
n
(1 ((
; D]) + 2 () ) y   k (s()  )2
o
As above, it can be shown, that a unique solution to H(2(k); k) = 0 exists if
and only if H(D) > 0 which is if and only if k  k1 > k0 where H(D; k1) = 0.
2(k) is strictly decreasing and 2(k)! 0 as k !1.
It must be checked that type D does not want to imitate type 2(k) in the
campaign and then implement D, which is
1 [0; 2(k)] y  1 ((2(k); D]) [(1 + 2 (D)) y], or, equivalently
1
2  G 1 (2(k); D)2 (D)   0 but 1 (2(k); D) =  F (2(k))
 
1
2  G

+ 12 .
Then the condition is
 
1
2  G

(1 + F (2(k))2 (D) )  2(D)2 .
Consider the function R() =
 
1
2  G (e ([0; ) ; (;D]))

(1 + F ()2 (D) ) 
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2(D)
2 . R(0) =  2(D)2 < 0, R0 > 0. As 2(k) & 0 as k ! 1, there exists
a unique k > 0 such that this kind of equilibrium exists only for k  k. Set
k1 = max fk; k1g.
(d) In this part we prove that there exists no equilibrium where politicians with
types [0; ] pool in campaign and policy, and agents in (;D] separate in cam-
paign and in policy. By contradiction assume that such an equilibrium exists
Then the probability of rst stage election of types in [; D] is:
1 (s () ; s ()) =

1 G

s ()
2

F ()+
Z D


1 G

s ()  s ()
2

f () d
where the rst term of the sum is the expected probability of being elected
against a politician in [ ; D] while the second term represents the probability
of being elected against a politician in [ D;].
The probability of second stage election is, instead:
2 () = 1 G
 
1
2
2   RD
0
2f () d
+
RD
0
f () d
!
Observe that, for every s
d1 (s; s ())
ds
=  1
2
"
g
s
2
Z 
0
f () d+
Z D

g

s  z ()
2

f () d
#
< 0
and
d2 ()
d
=  1
2
g
 
1
2
2   RD
0
2f () d
 +
RD
0
f () d
!2642 + 2 RD0 f () d + RD0 2f () d
 +
RD
0
f () d
2
375 < 0
So the expected utility, for a type  mimicking type  in [; D].
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U (s () ; ; s ()) =
(
1 G

s ()
2

F () +
Z D


1 G

s  s ()
2

f () d
)
(
y   k [  s ()]2 + y
"
1 G
 
1
2
2   RD
0
2f () d
 +
RD
0
f () d
!#)
Set:
bU(s; ; ; s ()) = (Z 
0
h
1 G
s
2
i
f () d+
Z D


1 G

s  s ()
2

f () d
)
(
y   k [  s]2 + y
"
1 G
 
1
2
2   RD
0
2f () d
 +
RD
0
f () d
!#)
Then U (s () ; ; s ()) = bU (s () ; ; ; s ()).
At equilibrium  = argmax bU (s () ; ; ; s ()). So a.e.
dbU(s () ; ; ; s ())
d j=
= 0
Using the chain rule
dbU(s () ; ; ; s ())
d j=
= bUs (s () ; ; ; s ()) s0 () + bU (s () ; ; ; s ())
We obtain that
ds
d j=
=
 bU (s () ; ; ; s ())bUs (s () ; ; ; s ())
The solution s has to be increasing and s (D) = D. We have
bUs(s; ; ; s ()) = d1 (s)
ds
h
y   k (  s)2 + y2 ()
i
+ 2k1 (s) (  s)
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and bU (s; ; ; s ()) = y1 (s) d2 ()
d
< 0
Observe that
bUs (s (D) ; s (D) ; s (D) ; s ()) = d1 (s (D))
ds
[y + y2 (D)] < 0
Let s be any solution. The function s is increasing and s (D) = D, but
ds
d
(D) =  
bU (s (D) ; s (D) ; s (D) ; s ())bUs (s (D) ; s (D) ; s (D) ; s ()) < 0
which yields a contradiction.
The possibility of an expressive campaign
Proof of Proposition 5:
Consider the following set
= (; z) = fz j z : [; D]! R, z continuous and increasing, z (t)  t, z (D) = zg
with the supnorm it is a complete metric space.
Consider the following functional:
For every z 2 = set
H (z) (t) = D +
Z D
t
Uz (z () ; ; )
Uzs (z () ; ; )
dD
Observe that
1. If z < D and if k is big enough bUs (z (D) ; z (D) ; z (D) ; z ())  0
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2. s1, 2 and their derivatives are bounded below and above by positive
constant, because g and f are C1
3. If  is big enough H is well dened and maps = in itself (for  big
enough Uss (z; ; ) is bounded away from zero).
4. If  is big enough
Uz (z;;)
Uzs (z;;)
is Lipschitz in z because g and f are C1.
Then for  big enough H is a contraction so it has a unique xed point,
z. Working like in the proof of Lemma 6 it can be proved that the solution can
be extended to [0; D). The proof of the existence of  (k) and its asymptotic
properties is the same as in Theorem 4.
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